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     docName="draft-ehlers-repsec-02"
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  <front>
    <title abbrev="RepSec">RepSec: Post-Breach Data Neutralisation Protocol</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ehlers-repsec-02"/>

    <author fullname="Ralph Ehlers" initials="R." surname="Ehlers">
      <organization>PastWipe Ltd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>contact@pastwipe.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date/>

    <keyword>post-breach</keyword>
    <keyword>data neutralisation</keyword>
    <keyword>data-centric security</keyword>

    <abstract>
      <t>This document introduces RepSec, a post-breach data neutralisation
      protocol designed to reduce the utility of exfiltrated or unauthorised
      data copies. RepSec operates independently of traditional perimeter
      and access-control security models by enforcing conditional data
      usability based on attestation and environmental integrity. The goal
      is to limit downstream exploitation, resale value, and operational
      impact of compromised data without disrupting legitimate use.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>

  <middle>

    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Traditional cybersecurity architectures focus on preventing
      unauthorised access to data. However, once data has been exfiltrated,
      copied, or otherwise exposed, existing controls provide limited
      mechanisms to govern its subsequent use.</t>
      <t>This document defines a conceptual framework for post-breach data
      control, where the objective shifts from access prevention to
      sustained control over data usability after exposure.</t>
      <t>RepSec introduces a protocol model that enables data to become
      conditionally usable based on verifiable environmental and
      contextual factors.</t>
      <t>For background on access-centric security models, see Zero Trust
      Architecture <xref target="NIST.SP.800-207"/>.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="problem-statement">
      <name>Problem Statement</name>
      <t>Current security models assume that data, once accessed, remains
      inherently usable. This assumption creates a structural gap:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Exfiltrated data can be reused indefinitely</li>
        <li>Data resale markets retain economic value</li>
        <li>Insider threats bypass perimeter controls</li>
        <li>Encryption protects transport and storage, not post-theft use</li>
      </ul>
      <t>As a result, organisations face persistent risk even after
      detection, containment, and remediation.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="design-goals">
      <name>Design Goals</name>
      <t>RepSec is designed with the following objectives:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Post-exposure control: Maintain influence over data usability after loss</li>
        <li>Environmental binding: Restrict data function to approved contexts</li>
        <li>Low operational overhead: Avoid significant latency or workflow disruption</li>
        <li>Compatibility: Operate alongside existing security infrastructure</li>
        <li>Auditability: Provide verifiable evidence of data state and access conditions</li>
      </ul>
    </section>

    <section anchor="architectural-overview">
      <name>Architectural Overview</name>
      <t>RepSec operates as a data-centric control layer that introduces
      conditional execution semantics to protected data objects.</t>
      <t>At a high level, the system includes:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Data objects with embedded or associated control logic</li>
        <li>An attestation mechanism validating execution environment integrity</li>
        <li>A policy framework governing permitted usage conditions</li>
        <li>A response mechanism that degrades or invalidates data outside
        approved parameters</li>
      </ul>
      <t>The protocol does not require modification of underlying storage
      systems but instead overlays a control plane governing data usability.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="operational-model">
      <name>Operational Model</name>
      <t>Under RepSec, data access is evaluated dynamically at the point of use.</t>
      <t>Example flow:</t>
      <ol type="1">
        <li>A data object is requested for use</li>
        <li>The execution environment is assessed against defined policies</li>
        <li>If conditions are satisfied, full functionality is granted</li>
        <li>If conditions are not satisfied, data is degraded, restricted,
        or rendered unusable</li>
      </ol>
      <t>This model ensures that possession of data does not guarantee its utility.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>RepSec addresses several threat vectors:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Data exfiltration and resale</li>
        <li>Insider misuse</li>
        <li>Unauthorised duplication</li>
        <li>Long-term exploitation of archived stolen data</li>
      </ul>
      <t>The protocol assumes that adversaries may obtain full data copies
      and focuses on reducing their ability to derive value from them.</t>
      <t>Detailed implementation strategies, including cryptographic methods
      and enforcement mechanisms, are outside the scope of this document.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="performance-considerations">
      <name>Performance Considerations</name>
      <t>RepSec is designed to minimise performance impact by:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Performing lightweight attestation checks</li>
        <li>Avoiding full system re-architecture</li>
        <li>Operating at the data interaction layer rather than network layer</li>
      </ul>
      <t>Specific performance characteristics depend on deployment context.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="interoperability">
      <name>Interoperability</name>
      <t>RepSec is intended to integrate with:</t>
      <ul>
        <li>Identity and access management systems</li>
        <li>Data loss prevention tools</li>
        <li>Endpoint detection and response platforms</li>
        <li>Existing encryption and key management systems</li>
      </ul>
      <t>The protocol complements rather than replaces these controls.</t>
    </section>

    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>
      <t>This document makes no requests of IANA.</t>
    </section>

  </middle>

  <back>
    <references anchor="informative-references">
      <name>Informative References</name>
      <reference anchor="NIST.SP.800-207"
                 target="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207">
        <front>
          <title>Zero Trust Architecture</title>
          <author initials="S." surname="Rose" fullname="Scott Rose">
            <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="O." surname="Borchert" fullname="Oliver Borchert">
            <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="S." surname="Mitchell" fullname="Stu Mitchell">
            <organization>Stu2Labs</organization>
          </author>
          <author initials="S." surname="Connelly" fullname="Sean Connelly">
            <organization>Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency</organization>
          </author>
          <date year="2020" month="August"/>
        </front>
        <seriesInfo name="NIST Special Publication" value="800-207"/>
        <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207"/>
      </reference>
    </references>
  </back>

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