Network Working Group E. C. Dogru Internet-Draft VERAX TEKNOLOJI LIMITED SIRKETI Intended status: Informational 27 August 2026 Expires: 28 February 2027 Cedulon: An Audit Layer for Agent-to-Agent Commerce draft-dogru-cedulon-02 Abstract This document defines the Cedulon Protocol, an audit layer for agent- to-agent commerce. Payment rails such as HTTP 402 flows (x402) and mandate protocols (AP2) already move value. They do not, by themselves, produce a fail-closed policy check and a signed spend receipt that a verifier can reconcile against a rail extract. Cedulon specifies a Trade Manifest (signed offer before payment), a Policy Decision Point with default deny, a Spend Receipt (COSE/CWT claim set after a gated payment), epoch checkpoints, and rail-extract reconciliation. The reconciliation shows that no settlement on the extract lacks a receipt and no settled receipt is absent from the extract. That result is unconditional only when the verifier pins the rail key out of band and states the period under audit; otherwise the document requires it to be reported as conditional. Checkpoints carry the suppression guarantee, so this revision profiles the checkpoint as a Signed Statement, gives the verification algorithm a step that consumes the transparency receipts returned for checkpoints, names what a witness holding a checkpoint the presented chain omits reports, brings equivocation within reach by comparing recorded copies against the presented chain, and states how checkpoint totals may be withheld without withholding the fact that they were. It also defines a Dispute Evidence Bundle (evidence, not an award) and optional SCITT anchoring. Cedulon is not a competitor to x402 or AP2; it sits above them. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 February 2027. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. Policy Decision Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2. Receipt Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Anchor / SCITT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Trade Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Spend Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. Optional payee countersignature . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. COSE Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Claim labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.2. COSE_Sign1 headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. Decision Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Rail Extract Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Record schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.3. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.4. Scope agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9. Reconciliation and Epoch Checkpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.1. Checkpoint claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 9.2. Genesis and continuity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.3. The transparency witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 9.4. Verification algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.5. Finding codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10. Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 11. Policy Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 12. SCITT Anchoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 14.1. T1: Prompt injection leads to unauthorized spend . . . . 26 14.2. T2: Runaway agent (loop spend) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14.3. T3: Replay of payment authority . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 14.4. T4: Receipt forgery or repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . 28 14.5. T5: Policy bypass via direct rail access . . . . . . . . 29 14.6. T6: TOCTOU between policy check and payment . . . . . . 29 14.7. T7: Signing-key leakage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 14.8. T8: Counterparty price gouging or defective delivery . . 30 14.9. MUST-T8-custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 14.10. T9: PII leakage into the transparency log . . . . . . . 31 14.11. T10: Secret spend via rail bypass . . . . . . . . . . . 32 14.12. T11: Checkpoint suppression or rollback . . . . . . . . 34 14.13. Optional escrow role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 16. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 16.1. Changes from -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 17. Evolution and Future Work (Informative) . . . . . . . . . . . 40 17.1. Re-attestation profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 17.2. Streaming reconciliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 17.3. Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 18. Informative Notes on Adjacent Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . 41 19. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 19.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 19.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Appendix A. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 1. Introduction _Note to Readers:_ This document is submitted as Informational. The author's eventual intended track, if the work is taken up, is a Standards Track profile of COSE [RFC9052] and CWT [RFC8392] for agent-spend receipts. This -02 does not claim IETF consensus. Agents can now pay. Open HTTP 402 protocols [X402] attach stablecoin settlement to ordinary requests. Card networks and processors issue agent-scoped tokens. Google's Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) [AP2] binds user intent to signed mandates. What is missing is an interoperable *audit layer*: a machine- checkable answer to "was this spend allowed by policy, against which offer, and what bytes were delivered?" Without that layer, a prompt- injected or looping agent can drain a rail that has already accepted a valid signature. A counterparty can ship the wrong artifact. A transparency log, if used at all, is proprietary. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 Cedulon fills that gap. It does not clear funds, hold custody, or operate a payment facilitator. An optional escrow actor is defined only as a third-party role interface (Section 14.13). Implementations of this specification MUST NOT take custody of funds or operate escrow (MUST-T8-custody). The control is an old one. Reconciling an internal ledger against an external statement is what double-entry bookkeeping [PACIOLI] made routine, and signing the artifacts on both sides is Grigg's triple- entry idea [GRIGG]. Neither is claimed here. What this document contributes is an open wire profile for that control in a setting where the parties are software: a COSE receipt shape, an extract shape, a checkpoint chain, and a verification algorithm precise enough that two implementations reach the same finding on the same evidence. The novelty is interoperability, not the idea. Neighbor drafts are complementary, not substitutes. draft-bates-atp [BATES-ATP] covers tamper-evident causal lineage as a signed DAG. Cedulon is the completeness layer: a spend that never produced a receipt is visible when an authenticated rail extract is reconciled (MUST-T10-1). 2. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The following terms are used: Trade Manifest: A signed statement produced *before* payment. It binds a description of goods or service, price, currency, acceptance-criteria hash, cancel condition, expiry, and an optional AP2 mandate reference. Policy Decision Point (PDP): The function that evaluates a structured spend request against stored policy. The default is deny. Spend Receipt: A signed statement produced *after* a gated payment attempt. It binds payer, payee, amount, currency, policy hash, manifestHash or an explicit noManifest flag, rail payment reference, timestampMs, nonce, prevReceiptHash, and outcome. Receipt Issuer: The party that signs Spend Receipts. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 Anchor: An optional SCITT Transparency Service [RFC9943] that registers a signed statement and returns a COSE receipt [RFC9942]. Dispute Evidence Bundle: A package of the Trade Manifest, the Spend Receipt, and a delivery hash. It is evidence for a later human or legal process. It is not an arbitral award and not an escrow release. Decision Token: A portable, single-use PDP allow encoded as COSE_Sign1. The claim set binds requestHash, policyHash, expiryMs, nonce, and singleUseId. See Section 7. Rail Extract: An authenticated list of settlement records for one account, one rail, and one time window. See Section 8. 3. Architecture Cedulon has three control-plane objects and one optional log: Principal --policy--> PDP --allow/deny--> x402/AP2 rail | v Receipt Issuer --> Spend Receipt | v Anchor / SCITT (optional) The payer agent never talks to the rail except through an adapter that calls the PDP first (MUST-T5-1). 3.1. Policy Decision Point The PDP evaluates structured fields only (MUST-T1-1): amount, currency, payee, tool identifier, nonce, optional manifest hash, and evaluation time. It applies limit, velocity, and scope checks (MUST- T2-1, MUST-T2-2). If the PDP is unreachable, uninitialized, or throws, the result is deny (MUST-T2-3). Denied attempts do not increment success counters (MUST-T2-4). An allow produces a Decision Token whose requestHash covers six fields: amount, currency, payee, tool, nonce, and manifestHash (MUST- T3-4, MUST-T6-1). The token is a COSE_Sign1 object (MUST-T6-4), is single-use (MUST-T6-2), and MAY be carried to the adapter that performs settlement. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 3.2. Receipt Issuer After the adapter attempts settlement (success or a recorded deny that still needs an audit trail for an allowed-then-aborted path), the Receipt Issuer signs a Spend Receipt over a canonical encoding (MUST-T4-1). Verifiers reject bad signatures and byte mismatch (MUST-T4-2). 3.3. Anchor / SCITT Parties MAY register the signed receipt (or a privacy-preserving hash encoding) as a SCITT Signed Statement [RFC9943] and attach the COSE receipt (MAY-T4-6). This document does not operate a Transparency Service. 4. Trade Manifest A Trade Manifest is the commerce analogue of a promise: it is issued *before* value moves. It is conceptually symmetric to a later Spend Receipt (promise then proof), and it MAY carry an AP2 mandate hash so that user intent and the Cedulon offer stay linked (SHOULD-T8-5). A Trade Manifest MUST bind all of the following (MUST-T8-1): * goods or service description * price (integer minor units, encoded as a decimal string matching 0|[1-9][0-9]*) * currency (ISO 4217 alphabetic or a documented token identifier) * acceptance-criteria hash (SHA-256 [RFC6234] of the exact delivery bytes or of a declared schema instance) * cancel condition (opaque string agreed by the parties) * expiry (POSIX milliseconds, expiresAtMs) It MAY include ap2MandateHash. The corresponding CBOR label is always present; a missing mandate is encoded as CBOR null. The manifest is COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] over a deterministic CBOR claim map (Section 6). manifestHash is the SHA-256 of the signed COSE bytes (MUST-T8-7). A spend bound to a manifest MUST be denied if the requested amount or currency differs from the manifest (MUST-T8-2) or if the manifest is expired (MUST-T3-3). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 A spend that is not bound to a verified manifest MUST be marked noManifest on the receipt and MUST still pass limit, velocity, and scope checks (MUST-T1-2). An implementation MAY refuse all noManifest spend (MAY-T1-4). 5. Spend Receipt The Spend Receipt claim set is carried in COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] wrapping a CWT-compatible map [RFC8392]. New receipts MUST use the COSE profile (Section 6). Claims (MUST-T4-3, MUST-T4-4, MUST-T4-7): +=================+===============================================+ | Claim | Description | +=================+===============================================+ | payer | Payer agent identifier | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | payee | Payee identifier | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | amount | Minor units as a decimal string 0|[1-9][0-9]* | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | currency | Currency identifier | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | policyHash | SHA-256 of the canonical policy document | | | (lowercase hex) | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | manifestHash | SHA-256 of the signed manifest COSE bytes, or | | | null when noManifest is true | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | noManifest | Boolean; MUST be true if and only if | | | manifestHash is null | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | x402PaymentRef | Rail payment reference, or null | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | timestampMs | POSIX milliseconds | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | nonce | Unique spend nonce; at least 128 bits of | | | randomness; unique in the issuer scope | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | prevReceiptHash | Previous receipt hash, or null for the first | | | receipt (SHOULD-T4-5) | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | outcome | settled or aborted | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ Table 1 Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 A receipt with outcome = settled MUST have a non-null x402PaymentRef (MUST-T4-7). An aborted receipt MUST NOT be added into checkpoint totals. All twelve labels in Section 6.1 are always present. An empty optional value is encoded as CBOR null, never by omitting the label. receiptHash is the SHA-256 of the receipt's signed COSE bytes, encoded as lowercase hex. Verifiers MUST reject a receipt if the signature fails or if the decoded claim map does not match the presented claims (MUST-T4-2). 5.1. Optional payee countersignature A payee MAY attach a countersignature over the issuer's signed Spend Receipt (MAY-T8-9). The profile uses a *detached* COSE_Sign1 [RFC9052] whose payload is a CBOR map with a single private-use label: +========+=============+======================================+ | Label | Claim | CBOR type | +========+=============+======================================+ | -70401 | receiptCose | bstr (exact issuer COSE_Sign1 bytes) | +--------+-------------+--------------------------------------+ Table 2 The countersignature uses the header profile in Section 6 and content type application/cedulon-countersign+cbor. This is a second Sign1 object, not RFC 9052 Countersignature0 (unprotected-header label 11). Countersignature0 would write into the issuer object and change receiptHash after issue, breaking the receipt chain. A detached Sign1 keeps the issuer bytes stable, reuses kid and content-type, and is absent by simply omitting the sibling object. Absence of a countersignature MUST NOT invalidate the issuer receipt (MAY-T8-9). If a countersignature is present, a verifier MUST reject it when the signature fails, when kid or content type does not match the configured payee key, or when label -70401 is not the issuer COSE bytes (MUST-T8-8). The identifier countersign-bad SHOULD be used for this condition. A Dispute Evidence Bundle that includes a verified countersignature has stronger evidence that the payee accepted those bytes; the bundle is still not an award (MUST-T8-4). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 6. COSE Profile This profile uses deterministic CBOR [RFC8949] Section 4.2.1 (definite lengths, shortest integer form, map keys sorted in *bytewise lexicographic* order of their encoded keys). Implementations MUST encode only the types used by Cedulon claim maps: null, bool, unsigned and negative integers, UTF-8 text, byte strings, arrays, and maps (MUST-T4-1). 6.1. Claim labels Registered CWT claims [RFC8392] are not required in -02. Cedulon uses CWT private-use integer labels less than -65536 so that the profile does not occupy the 100-110 registry range. Receipt labels (MUST-T4-3, MUST-T4-4, MUST-T4-7): +========+=================+==============================+ | Label | Claim | CBOR type | +========+=================+==============================+ | -70001 | payer | tstr | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70002 | payee | tstr | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70003 | amount | tstr | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70004 | currency | tstr | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70005 | policyHash | tstr (lowercase hex SHA-256) | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70006 | manifestHash | tstr / null | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70007 | noManifest | bool | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70008 | x402PaymentRef | tstr / null | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70009 | timestampMs | uint | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70010 | nonce | tstr | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70011 | prevReceiptHash | tstr / null | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ | -70012 | outcome | tstr (settled / aborted) | +--------+-----------------+------------------------------+ Table 3 Checkpoint labels (MUST-T11-1): Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +========+====================+=========================+ | Label | Claim | CBOR type | +========+====================+=========================+ | -70101 | epoch | uint | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70102 | startMs | uint | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70103 | endMs | uint | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70104 | receiptCount | uint | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70105 | chainHeadHash | tstr / null | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70106 | totals | map tstr -> tstr / null | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ | -70107 | prevCheckpointHash | tstr / null | +--------+--------------------+-------------------------+ Table 4 Manifest labels (MUST-T8-1): +========+========================+=============+ | Label | Claim | CBOR type | +========+========================+=============+ | -70201 | description | tstr | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70202 | amount | tstr | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70203 | currency | tstr | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70204 | acceptanceCriteriaHash | tstr | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70205 | cancelCondition | tstr | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70206 | expiresAtMs | uint | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ | -70207 | ap2MandateHash | tstr / null | +--------+------------------------+-------------+ Table 5 Decision Token labels (MUST-T6-4): Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +========+=============+==============================+ | Label | Claim | CBOR type | +========+=============+==============================+ | -70301 | requestHash | tstr | +--------+-------------+------------------------------+ | -70302 | policyHash | tstr (lowercase hex SHA-256) | +--------+-------------+------------------------------+ | -70303 | expiryMs | uint | +--------+-------------+------------------------------+ | -70304 | nonce | tstr | +--------+-------------+------------------------------+ | -70305 | singleUseId | tstr | +--------+-------------+------------------------------+ Table 6 6.2. COSE_Sign1 headers The protected header MUST be a deterministic CBOR map containing (MUST-T4-1, MUST-T4-8): * 1 (alg) = -19 (Ed25519, [RFC9864]; the generic EdDSA value -8 from [RFC9053] is deprecated for this profile) * 3 (content type) = a tstr that distinguishes the payload: application/cedulon-receipt+cbor, application/cedulon- checkpoint+cbor, application/cedulon-manifest+cbor, application/ cedulon-decision+cbor, or application/cedulon-countersign+cbor * 4 (kid) = bstr, mandatory. The profile computes kid as the first eight bytes of SHA-256 over the issuer's SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER. A verifier MUST obtain the public key from an authenticated channel (preconfigured issuer set, directory, or transparency statement) and MUST reject a message whose kid does not match that key. The unprotected header MUST be empty. The payload MUST be the CBOR encoding of the claim map. The signature is Ed25519 [RFC8032] over the COSE Sig_structure ["Signature1", protected, h'', payload]. 7. Decision Token A Decision Token is the portable encoding of a PDP allow. It is COSE_Sign1 with the header profile in Section 6 and the labels in Section 6.1. All five labels are always present (MUST-T6-4). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 11] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 requestHash MUST be the six-field hash defined for the PDP (MUST- T6-1). policyHash MUST be the SHA-256 of the canonical policy document the PDP evaluated. expiryMs is a Unix time in milliseconds after which the token MUST be treated as expired (SHOULD-T6-3). nonce is the request nonce. singleUseId is the identifier consumed on the first settlement attempt (MUST-T6-2). A party that accepts a Decision Token MUST reject it if the signature fails, if kid does not match a configured PDP key, if the content type is not application/cedulon-decision+cbor, if the decoded claim map does not match the presented claims, or if expiryMs is in the past (MUST-T6-5). 8. Rail Extract Profile A verifier checks completeness against a *rail extract*, not against the issuer's own receipts alone (MUST-T10-7). 8.1. Record schema Each settlement record MUST contain: +=============+===============================+ | Field | Type | +=============+===============================+ | ref | tstr (rail payment reference) | +-------------+-------------------------------+ | amount | tstr matching 0|[1-9][0-9]* | +-------------+-------------------------------+ | currency | tstr | +-------------+-------------------------------+ | timestampMs | uint | +-------------+-------------------------------+ Table 7 8.2. Scope An extract is scoped to one account identifier, one rail identifier, and one half-open time window [windowStartMs, windowEndMs). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 12] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 8.3. Authentication The mock rail in the companion implementation signs the extract with Ed25519 over a canonical encoding of the scoped body. A verifier MUST obtain the extract from the rail or from a signature the rail published (MUST-T10-7). A deployment that cannot do so is running the reconciliation against evidence it did not obtain independently, and MUST report the guarantee as conditional. A signature on an extract proves internal consistency, not origin: a key generated by whoever produced the object verifies against itself. The verifier therefore MUST obtain the rail's public key out of band and MUST verify the extract signature against that key rather than against any key the extract carries (MUST-T10-8). A verifier that holds no such key MUST treat the guarantee as conditional. Keys are compared as bytes. A verifier MUST compare the pinned key and the key that signed the extract by their SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER encoding, not by any text encoding of it, so that the same key presented in a different envelope still compares equal (MUST-T10-9). A pinned key the verifier cannot decode is a fault in the verifier's own configuration, not evidence about the extract, and MUST be reported as trust-key-unreadable rather than as a key mismatch. What a verifier emits for an extract it cannot authenticate depends on whether it stated an expectation. With no pinned key the verifier has asserted nothing, so an extract that does not carry a verifiable signature is unauthenticated-extract, a warning: completeness findings may still be computed, but the guarantee is *conditional* on the extract being authentic. With a pinned key the verifier has asserted what it requires, and an extract that fails to meet it is a failure rather than a caveat; see the verification algorithm for which finding applies. -00 defined only the first case, and readers of -00 should note that this revision makes the pinned case fail closed. See Section 14. 8.4. Scope agreement An extract declares a window and carries settlement records. The two MUST agree: a verifier MUST report every settlement record whose timestampMs falls outside [windowStartMs, windowEndMs) as extract- scope-mismatch, identified by that record's ref (MUST-T10-10). This check is about the extract's internal consistency and MUST be performed whether or not a rail key is pinned. A verifier that knows which account, rail, and window it is auditing MUST also check the extract against that expectation and MUST fail closed when the extract does not cover it (MUST-T10-11). An extract Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 13] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 for another account or rail, or one whose window does not span the period under audit, cannot support a completeness claim about that period. A verifier that states no period leaves the extract free to define one, and an extract that reports on a millisecond balances as easily as one that reports on a month. Pinning a key establishes who signed; only a stated period establishes what the signature had to cover. A verifier that has not stated the period under audit therefore MUST emit unstated-audit-window and MUST treat the guarantee as conditional (MUST-T10-15), whatever else verifies. 9. Reconciliation and Epoch Checkpoints Completeness is the property that, given an authenticated rail extract, every settlement in the extract has a matching settled Spend Receipt, every settled receipt has a matching settlement, receipt and checkpoint hash chains verify, and checkpoint totals equal the sum of *settled* receipts in the checkpoint window. If a spend occurred without a receipt, the missing receipt is itself the evidence (MUST- T10-2). A checkpoint published with its totals withheld (Section 9.1) cannot contribute the last of those to the property. It is not a violation of completeness and it is not a demonstration of it either: the comparison was not made, and a result that rests on a comparison nobody made is conditional (MUST-T11-12). 9.1. Checkpoint claims An epoch checkpoint MUST be COSE_Sign1-signed with the header profile in Section 6 and MUST bind all of the following (MUST-T11-1): epoch, startMs, endMs, receiptCount, chainHeadHash, totals, and prevCheckpointHash. The checkpoint window is half-open [startMs, endMs) (MUST-T11-7). receiptCount MUST equal the number of receipts (settled and aborted) whose timestampMs falls in that window. chainHeadHash MUST equal receiptHash of the last receipt in that window, or null if the window is empty (MUST-T11-2). Where totals is present it MUST sum only receipts with outcome = settled; the one permitted absence is the signed redaction below. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 14] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 An issuer that publishes a checkpoint without its totals MUST encode totals as null in the signed payload (MUST-T11-12). An empty map is an honest zero for an empty window and is not a redaction. Because the redaction is inside the signature, it cannot be added to, or removed from, a checkpoint after signing. A verifier MUST NOT accept a redaction asserted anywhere but the signed payload (MUST-T11-13). A presentation-layer flag alongside a checkpoint is chosen by whoever presents it, which is the party under audit; honouring such a flag would let that party switch off the totals comparison for a checkpoint whose signed totals are wrong. The structural claims (epoch, startMs, endMs, receiptCount, chainHeadHash, prevCheckpointHash) MUST NOT be redacted: a checkpoint missing any of them does not decode, and a verifier MUST treat it as a failed checkpoint rather than as a redacted one. 9.2. Genesis and continuity The first checkpoint in a presented chain is the genesis checkpoint of that chain. Its prevCheckpointHash MUST be null. Epoch numbers MUST be consecutive integers. Adjacent windows MUST satisfy next.startMs = prev.endMs (MUST-T11-8). A later checkpoint that omits a prefix of earlier epochs (prefix deletion) is detectable only if an external witness (transparency log) has recorded the missing prefix (MUST-T11-9). Without that witness, T11 guarantees about suppression are *conditional*. -01 stated that dependency and stopped there: nothing in its verification algorithm read a transparency receipt, so the witness had no way to speak. This revision gives it one. A verifier that holds transparency receipts for the period under audit compares what the witness recorded against what the chain presented, and reports the difference under its own name (Section 9.3). A witness that holds a checkpoint the presented chain omits is not the same condition as a chain that leaves a gap in its own coverage, and the two MUST NOT be reported under one identifier (MUST-T11-11). The first says evidence is being withheld; the second says the evidence shown is incomplete. An operator who cannot tell them apart cannot tell an incomplete record from a concealed one. 9.3. The transparency witness A checkpoint registered with a Transparency Service [RFC9943] is a Signed Statement whose payload is the checkpoint COSE object and whose content type is application/cedulon-checkpoint+cbor (Section 12). The service returns a receipt [RFC9942] that binds the statement it recorded. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 15] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 A verifier MAY be given such receipts for the period under audit. It is a distinct input from the presented checkpoint chain, and supplying it is optional: a verifier given none performs the same steps, and reports the same findings, that it would if this input did not exist (MUST-T11-10). Supplying an empty set is not the same as supplying none. An empty set says a witness is configured and recorded nothing, which is itself reportable; absence says no witness was consulted. A receipt binds a statement hash, not a statement. The body is not carried by the receipt and a verifier will often not hold it. Two levels of checking follow from that, and they are not the same (MUST- T11-10). Every receipt MUST have its signature verified before it counts for anything. That is what establishes the hash as one the service signed for, and it is all that comparing recorded hashes against presented ones requires: the verifier computes the statement hash of each presented checkpoint itself. A receipt accompanied by the statement body carries more, and MUST be checked further before that body is relied on. The body's statement hash MUST equal the hash the receipt binds, and the body MUST itself verify as a checkpoint. A body that fails either check proves nothing and MUST be ignored rather than counted, while the receipt it came with remains usable for the hash comparison. Equivocation is the case that needs a body, because it compares claims rather than hashes. What such a receipt establishes, and what it does not, is worth stating plainly. It establishes that the service signed for that statement. Whether the statement is a member of an append-only log, and whether that log has ever equivocated, are properties of the service and its own proofs, not of Cedulon. A verifier that treats a signed receipt as proof of log membership is claiming more than the receipt carries. 9.4. Verification algorithm A verifier MUST perform all of these steps and MUST report every finding they produce (MUST-T10-1, MUST-T11-2). They are numbered for reference, not to require an evaluation order: no step short-circuits another, and an implementation may evaluate them in any order that produces the same set of findings. One data dependency is worth naming, because "any order" read naively would break it. Step 15 decides which transparency receipts, and which statement bodies, survive checking. Steps 14 and 16 consume Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 16] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 what survives. An implementation that ran step 14 against unchecked bodies, or step 16 against unchecked receipts, would not produce the same set of findings, so that order is not among the permitted ones. Nothing else in this list feeds another step. When a step names an identifier in backticks, that identifier SHOULD be used for the condition in diagnostic output. The normative requirement is the behaviour: report the condition, identified by the ref or other handle given in the step. The identifiers are not an interoperability surface. 1. Establish the subject of the audit. When an extract is supplied, the settlement records it carries are the ones reconciled; a settlement list from any other source MUST NOT be substituted for them (MUST-T10-12). If the caller supplies both and they differ, the verifier MUST report that the caller- supplied list disagrees with the extract, and MUST still reconcile the extract. The identifier extract-settlement- mismatch SHOULD be used for this condition in diagnostic output. 2. Verify the extract signature against the out-of-band rail key (MUST-T10-8, MUST-T10-9). If no key is pinned, the verifier MUST treat the completeness guarantee as conditional (MUST- T10-7). The identifier unauthenticated-extract SHOULD be used for this condition in diagnostic output. If a key is pinned and cannot be decoded, the verifier MUST report that the pinned key is unreadable. The identifier trust-key-unreadable SHOULD be used for this condition. If a key is pinned and the signature does not verify against it, or verifies against a different key, the verifier MUST report that the extract is not signed by the pinned key. The identifier extract-key-mismatch SHOULD be used for this condition. A finding that puts the extract itself in doubt MUST prevent an unconditional guarantee. 3. Check scope. The verifier MUST report each settlement record whose timestampMs falls outside the declared window, identified by that record's ref (MUST-T10-10). When the verifier states an expected account, rail, or window, it MUST report an extract that does not cover it (MUST-T10-11). The identifier extract- scope-mismatch SHOULD be used for both conditions. If the verifier stated no period, it MUST treat the guarantee as conditional (MUST-T10-15). The identifier unstated-audit-window SHOULD be used for this condition. 4. Decode each Spend Receipt COSE_Sign1. Reject if Ed25519 verify fails, if kid does not match the configured issuer key, if the content type is not the receipt type, or if the decoded claim map does not match the presented claims (MUST-T4-2, MUST-T4-8). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 17] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 5. Scope the receipts. When an extract is supplied, only receipts whose timestampMs falls in the extract's declared window are reconciled against it (MUST-T10-16). A receipt outside that window is not a completeness failure against this extract; auditing a longer period requires extracts that cover it. Receipts remain subject to every other check regardless of window. 6. Walk receipts in issuer order. The first prevReceiptHash MUST be null. Each later prevReceiptHash MUST equal receiptHash of the previous receipt. A miss MUST be reported as a break in the receipt chain. The identifier receipt-chain-break SHOULD be used for this condition. 7. Index settled receipts and extract records by ref. A ref that appears more than once on either side MUST be reported as a repeated reference (MUST-T10-6). The identifier duplicate-ref SHOULD be used for this condition. 8. For each ref that appears exactly once on each side, require a one-to-one match on ref AND amount AND currency (MUST-T10-1). Amount or currency mismatch MUST be reported as a settlement that does not match its receipt, identified by that ref. The identifier settlement-mismatch SHOULD be used for this condition. A settlement with no receipt MUST be reported as lacking a receipt, identified by its ref (MUST-T10-2). The identifier settlement-without-receipt SHOULD be used for this condition. A settled receipt with no extract row MUST be reported as a completeness failure (MUST-T10-3). The identifier receipt-without-settlement SHOULD be used for this condition. A settled receipt with a null rail ref MUST be reported as settled without a rail reference. The identifier settled-without-ref SHOULD be used for this condition. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 18] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 9. A ref already reported as repeating MUST still be reconciled by amount rather than dropped from the comparison (MUST-T10-13). For each currency under that ref, compare the total settled against the total receipted. A settled total that exceeds the receipted total MUST be reported as a settlement lacking a receipt, and the finding MUST state the unaccounted amount. The identifier settlement-without-receipt SHOULD be used for this condition. A settled total that is less than the receipted total MUST be reported as a settlement that does not match its receipt, identified by that ref. The identifier settlement- mismatch SHOULD be used for this condition. An amount on that repeating ref that cannot be parsed as an integer MUST be reported without abandoning the audit; the identifier malformed- amount SHOULD be used for this condition. A verifier MUST still report findings for the remaining records. 10. Aborted receipts are not matched to extract rows and are not added to totals. 11. Decode each checkpoint. Reject a failed signature, and reject a kid that does not match the key obtained for the checkpoint issuer, on the same terms as a receipt (MUST-T4-8). Require receiptCount, chainHeadHash, and totals to match the receipts in [startMs, endMs) as defined above (MUST-T11-2). The identifier checkpoint-total-mismatch SHOULD be used for a failed signature, a wrong receiptCount, or totals that disagree, and checkpoint- head-mismatch for a chainHeadHash that is not the last in-window receipt. If the signed totals is null, the verifier cannot perform the totals comparison for that checkpoint. It MUST report that the comparison was skipped and MUST treat the completeness guarantee as conditional; the absence of a comparison is not a passed comparison (MUST-T11-12). The identifier checkpoint-totals-redacted SHOULD be used for this condition. receiptCount and chainHeadHash MUST still be checked. A checkpoint that fails verification MUST NOT be treated as redacted, whatever it claims about its own totals. 12. Every chained receipt MUST fall in exactly one checkpoint window. A gap or double count MUST be reported as a window coverage failure (MUST-T11-7, MUST-T11-8). The identifier window-coverage SHOULD be used for this condition. 13. Walk checkpoints in epoch order. prevCheckpointHash MUST equal the SHA-256 of the previous checkpoint COSE bytes, or null for genesis (MUST-T11-4). The identifier checkpoint-total-mismatch SHOULD be used for a broken chain, which is the fourth condition its table row names. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 19] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 14. If two successfully verified checkpoints share an epoch number and have different hashes, the verifier MUST report equivocation (MUST-T11-3). The identifier equivocation SHOULD be used for this condition. The checkpoints compared here are those presented *together with* any carried by verified transparency receipts (step 15). Comparing only the presented chain cannot raise this finding: MUST-T11-8, applied in step 12, requires that chain's epochs to be consecutive, so no two of its members share an epoch. A copy recorded by a witness is where the second one is found. 15. If transparency receipts were supplied, discard any whose signature fails (MUST-T11-10). The survivors are the recorded statement hashes used in step 16. Where a receipt also carries the statement body, discard that body unless its statement hash equals the one the receipt binds and it verifies as a checkpoint; the surviving bodies are what step 14 compares. Discarding a body does not discard its receipt. 16. Compare the surviving witness records against the presented chain (MUST-T11-11). For each presented checkpoint with no surviving record, report that it is not anchored; the identifier checkpoint-not-anchored SHOULD be used. This is a warning: a witness may have been configured after the checkpoint was issued, and an operator's own gap is not evidence of concealment. For each surviving record whose statement is absent from the presented chain, report that a recorded checkpoint was withheld; the identifier checkpoint-withheld SHOULD be used. This is a finding and the audit MUST fail. The verifier MUST NOT report a withheld checkpoint as a window coverage failure (MUST-T11-11). 17. If any finding remains that is not a warning (a warning is a condition that only makes the completeness guarantee conditional), the audit MUST fail (MUST-T10-4). 9.5. Finding codes The identifiers below are for diagnostic output. They are not an interoperability surface. A finding object that can be carried on the wire is outside the scope of this document and may be defined later. Two implementations interoperate when they accept the same inputs and fail or warn on the same conditions, not when they print the same strings. A condition that makes the audit fail is a finding. A condition that only makes the completeness guarantee conditional is a warning. Warnings MUST still appear in operator-facing output (MUST-T10-14). Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 20] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +=============================+=============+=====================+ | Code | Effect | Meaning | +=============================+=============+=====================+ | settlement-without-receipt | audit fails | Extract row has no | | | | matching settled | | | | receipt, or a | | | | repeating ref | | | | settled more than | | | | it receipted | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | receipt-without-settlement | audit fails | Settled receipt ref | | | | is not on the | | | | extract | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | settlement-mismatch | audit fails | Same ref, different | | | | amount or currency, | | | | including a | | | | repeating ref that | | | | settled less than | | | | it receipted | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | duplicate-ref | audit fails | Ref appears more | | | | than once on one | | | | side | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | settled-without-ref | audit fails | outcome is settled | | | | and x402PaymentRef | | | | is null | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | receipt-chain-break | audit fails | Signature or | | | | prevReceiptHash | | | | failed | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | checkpoint-total-mismatch | audit fails | Totals, count, | | | | signature, or | | | | checkpoint chain | | | | failed | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | checkpoint-head-mismatch | audit fails | chainHeadHash is | | | | not the last in- | | | | window receipt | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | equivocation | audit fails | Two distinct hashes | | | | for one epoch | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | window-coverage | audit fails | Gap, overlap, or | | | | non-adjacent / non- | | | | consecutive windows | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 21] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | unauthenticated-extract | guarantee | No pinned rail key, | | | conditional | or the extract has | | | | no verifiable | | | | signature | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | extract-key-mismatch | audit fails | Extract is signed | | | | by a key other than | | | | the pinned rail | | | | key, or does not | | | | verify against it | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | trust-key-unreadable | audit fails | The pinned rail key | | | | could not be | | | | decoded; the | | | | verifier's | | | | configuration is at | | | | fault | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | extract-scope-mismatch | audit fails | A record falls | | | | outside the | | | | declared window, or | | | | the extract does | | | | not cover the | | | | expected account, | | | | rail, or window | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | extract-settlement-mismatch | audit fails | A caller-supplied | | | | settlement list | | | | disagrees with the | | | | extract; the | | | | extract is | | | | authoritative | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | malformed-amount | audit fails | An amount on a ref | | | | already reported as | | | | repeating that | | | | could not be parsed | | | | as an integer | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | unstated-audit-window | guarantee | The verifier stated | | | conditional | no period, so the | | | | extract defined its | | | | own | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | countersign-bad | audit fails | Present payee | | | | countersignature | | | | failed verify | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 22] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | checkpoint-withheld | audit fails | A verified | | | | transparency | | | | receipt binds a | | | | checkpoint the | | | | presented chain | | | | does not contain | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | checkpoint-not-anchored | guarantee | A witness was | | | conditional | supplied and holds | | | | no verified receipt | | | | for this checkpoint | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ | checkpoint-totals-redacted | guarantee | The checkpoint was | | | conditional | signed with totals | | | | null, so the totals | | | | comparison could | | | | not be made | +-----------------------------+-------------+---------------------+ Table 8 A finding that puts the extract itself in doubt (extract-key- mismatch, trust-key-unreadable, extract-scope-mismatch, or extract- settlement-mismatch) MUST also prevent an unconditional guarantee, not merely fail the audit. An unconditional guarantee therefore requires all of: an extract, a pinned rail key the extract's signature verifies against, a stated period the extract covers, no finding that puts the extract in doubt, and no warning that withholds part of the comparison. A checkpoint whose totals were signed as withheld (checkpoint-totals-redacted) removes a comparison the guarantee rests on, and a presented checkpoint a supplied witness does not hold (checkpoint-not-anchored) leaves part of the chain unwitnessed. Either one makes the result conditional. Anything less than the whole list is conditional, and the report MUST say so. An implementation MUST make the guarantee and any warnings visible in whatever human-readable audit report it produces under this document, not only in a returned structure (MUST-T10-14). A report that says the books balance while withholding that the balance is conditional invites the reader to take a conditional result for an unconditional one. Checkpoints SHOULD be registered with a Transparency Service (SHOULD- T11-5). A test deployment MAY use an in-process append-only log as the witness (MAY-T11-6). Cedulon still MUST NOT take custody. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 23] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 The guarantee named above is about completeness against the extract, which is the subject of T10. It is not a claim that no checkpoint was suppressed. Suppression is the subject of T11, and a report MUST NOT be read as settling it when no witness was consulted: with no transparency receipts, the presented chain is self-consistent by construction and says nothing about what it left out (MUST-T11-9). A verifier that consulted a witness and found every presented checkpoint recorded, with nothing recorded that was not presented, has discharged T11 for the period those receipts cover, and for no longer. 10. Lifecycle 1. *Manifest.* Parties sign a Trade Manifest (optional for metered API spend; required for goods with acceptance criteria). 2. *Policy check.* The adapter submits a structured request to the PDP. Default is deny. An allow is a Decision Token (MUST-T6-4). 3. *Payment.* On allow, the adapter performs the x402 (or other rail) exchange using exactly the decision fields (MUST-T6-1). The Decision Token is consumed (MUST-T6-2). A reused nonce is denied (MUST-T3-1, MUST-T3-2). A tampered or expired token is denied (MUST-T6-5). 4. *Receipt.* The Receipt Issuer signs a Spend Receipt. Rail credentials MUST NOT appear in the receipt, logs, or tool results (MUST-T5-2, MUST-T7-1). 5. *Dispute Evidence Bundle.* If delivery bytes do not match the acceptance-criteria hash, an implementation MUST be able to emit a bundle of manifest + receipt + delivery hash (MUST-T8-3). The bundle MUST NOT be described as an arbitral award or escrow release (MUST-T8-4). 11. Policy Semantics Policy is default deny. The engine understands three families of rule: * *Limit:* maximum amount per payment; maximum cumulative amount per window (MUST-T2-2). * *Velocity:* maximum number of allowed payments per window (MUST- T2-1). * *Scope:* optional allow-lists for payee, currency, and tool name. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 24] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 Fail-closed: missing engine, crash, or exception yields deny (MUST- T2-3). Implementations SHOULD emit stable reason codes (SHOULD- T2-5). Decision tokens SHOULD expire after a short TTL (SHOULD- T6-3). The agent-facing spend interface MUST invoke the PDP and MUST NOT expose a parallel ungated rail call to the model (MUST-T5-1). 12. SCITT Anchoring A Receipt Issuer or relying party MAY construct a SCITT Signed Statement whose payload is either the Spend Receipt COSE object or a privacy profile (Section 13) and register it with a Transparency Service [RFC9943]. The service returns a COSE receipt [RFC9942]. Embedding that receipt yields a Transparent Statement. Cedulon does not define a new transparency algorithm. An epoch checkpoint MUST be registrable on the same terms (MUST- T11-14). Its Signed Statement carries the checkpoint COSE_Sign1 object as the payload and application/cedulon-checkpoint+cbor as the content type, which is among the media types Section 15 asks to have registered and which, until then, is a placeholder like the rest. Nothing else about registration differs from a receipt. This is a short section for a requirement -01 was missing, and the omission mattered more than its length suggests. -01 asked for checkpoints to be registered (SHOULD-T11-5) while profiling only the receipt here, so the object carrying the suppression guarantee had no stated form to be registered in. Two implementations could follow -01 to the letter and register incomparable things. 13. Privacy Considerations A public transparency encoding MUST support omitting or hashing payer and payee identifiers and MUST support amount redaction or bucket encoding (MUST-T9-1). Implementations MUST NOT write government-ID numbers, payment-instrument PAN, or street address into a public statement (MUST-T9-2). Default public anchors SHOULD publish policyHash, manifestHash, receiptHash, and timestampMs rather than full claims (SHOULD-T9-3). A private auditor MAY receive an unredacted receipt out of band (MAY-T9-4). The paragraph above counts receipt fields. A checkpoint publishes something a receipt does not: a per-currency total for a whole window, which discloses trading volume even when every individual receipt is redacted (MUST-T9-5). -01 gave no rule for it, so an implementation could publish that total, or withhold it in a way no verifier could recognise, and neither reading contradicted the text. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 25] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 The rule is the one stated in Section 9: totals MAY be withheld by signing it as null (MUST-T11-12), and only that form counts as a redaction (MUST-T11-13). The structural claims are not redactable, because a verifier that cannot read the window or the chain head cannot check anything at all, and a checkpoint that hid them would be indistinguishable from a broken one. Withholding is honest and it is also a cost: a verifier that cannot recompute the totals says so, and the completeness guarantee for that window is conditional. A deployment that wants an unconditional result publishes the totals; a deployment that wants the volume private accepts a conditional one. What a deployment MUST NOT do is obtain the unconditional result while withholding the evidence for it. 14. Security Considerations This section is authoritative for the protocol requirements in this document. The companion repository file THREAT_MODEL.md is informative and MUST NOT be read as overriding this section. Requirement identifiers take the form KEYWORD-Tn-k, where KEYWORD is MUST, SHOULD, or MAY, n is the threat number in this section, and k is a sequence number within that threat. MUST-T8-custody is the custody prohibition under T8. The tables below define the requirement text those citations refer to. 14.1. T1: Prompt injection leads to unauthorized spend +=============+=============================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+=============================================+ | MUST-T1-1 | The PDP MUST decide from structured request | | | fields and stored policy, not from model- | | | generated prose. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T1-2 | A spend that is not bound to a verified | | | Trade Manifest MUST be marked noManifest on | | | the Spend Receipt and MUST still be subject | | | to limit, velocity, and scope policy. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T1-3 | Hosts SHOULD require a human confirmation | | | channel for first-use payees. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T1-4 | An implementation MAY refuse all noManifest | | | spend. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------+ Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 26] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 Table 9 14.2. T2: Runaway agent (loop spend) +=============+==================================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+==================================================+ | MUST-T2-1 | Policy MUST express a maximum payment count per | | | configured time window (velocity). | +-------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T2-2 | Policy MUST express a maximum amount per payment | | | and a maximum cumulative amount per window. | +-------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T2-3 | If the PDP is unreachable, uninitialized, or | | | throws during evaluation, the spend MUST be | | | denied (fail-closed, default deny). | +-------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T2-4 | A denied attempt MUST NOT increment the allowed- | | | spend counters as if it had succeeded. | +-------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T2-5 | Implementations SHOULD emit a stable reason code | | | for velocity and limit denials. | +-------------+--------------------------------------------------+ Table 10 14.3. T3: Replay of payment authority +=============+=========================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+=========================================+ | MUST-T3-1 | Every spend attempt that the PDP allows | | | MUST include a nonce that the | | | implementation has not accepted before. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------+ | MUST-T3-2 | A second attempt that reuses a nonce | | | MUST be denied. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------+ | MUST-T3-3 | A Trade Manifest MUST carry an expiry; | | | a spend against an expired manifest | | | MUST be denied. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------+ | MUST-T3-4 | A PDP allow decision MUST be bound to a | | | hash of the request fields it evaluated | | | and MUST be single-use. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T3-5 | Nonce stores SHOULD persist across | | | process restart when the deployment is | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 27] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | not a test fixture. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------+ Table 11 14.4. T4: Receipt forgery or repudiation +=============+====================================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+====================================================+ | MUST-T4-1 | A Spend Receipt MUST be signed by the Receipt | | | Issuer over a canonical encoding of its claims. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T4-2 | Verifiers MUST reject a receipt whose signature | | | does not validate or whose canonical bytes do not | | | match the signed payload. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T4-3 | A Spend Receipt MUST include payer, payee, amount, | | | currency, policyHash, timestampMs, and nonce. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T4-4 | A Spend Receipt MUST include manifestHash or an | | | explicit noManifest flag, never an ambiguous empty | | | hash. Empty optional values are CBOR null; labels | | | are never absent. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T4-5 | Receipts SHOULD form a hash chain | | | (prevReceiptHash) so omission is detectable within | | | one issuer stream. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T4-6 | Parties MAY register the signed receipt as a SCITT | | | statement to obtain a COSE receipt. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T4-7 | A Spend Receipt MUST include outcome (settled or | | | aborted). A settled receipt MUST have a non-null | | | rail ref. Aborted receipts MUST NOT enter | | | checkpoint totals. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T4-8 | COSE_Sign1 protected headers MUST use alg -19 | | | (Ed25519), a mandatory kid, and a payload-specific | | | content type. Verifiers MUST reject a kid that | | | does not match the configured issuer key. | +-------------+----------------------------------------------------+ Table 12 Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 28] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 14.5. T5: Policy bypass via direct rail access +=============+==========================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+==========================================+ | MUST-T5-1 | The agent-facing spend interface MUST | | | invoke the PDP and MUST NOT expose a | | | parallel ungated rail call to the model. | +-------------+------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T5-2 | Rail credentials, wallet handles, and | | | facilitator tokens MUST NOT be placed in | | | tool results or prompts. | +-------------+------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T5-3 | Hosts SHOULD run the PDP and signing | | | keys in a process the model runtime | | | cannot write. | +-------------+------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T5-4 | A deployment MAY use OS or hardware | | | isolation between the model and the PDP. | +-------------+------------------------------------------+ Table 13 14.6. T6: TOCTOU between policy check and payment +=============+=====================================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+=====================================================+ | MUST-T6-1 | Payment settlement MUST use the same six | | | requestHash fields the PDP evaluated: | | | amount, currency, payee, tool, nonce, and | | | manifestHash. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T6-2 | An allow decision MUST be consumed on the | | | first settlement attempt, success or | | | fail-closed abort, and MUST NOT authorize | | | a later different request. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T6-3 | Implementations SHOULD treat a decision | | | older than a short TTL as expired. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T6-4 | An allow Decision Token MUST be | | | COSE_Sign1 with CWT private-use labels | | | -70301..-70305 (requestHash, policyHash, | | | expiryMs, nonce, singleUseId) and content | | | type application/cedulon-decision+cbor. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T6-5 | A party that accepts a Decision Token | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 29] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | MUST reject a failed signature, a kid or | | | content-type mismatch, a claim-map | | | mismatch, or an expired expiryMs. | +-------------+-----------------------------------------------------+ Table 14 14.7. T7: Signing-key leakage +=============+===========================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+===========================================+ | MUST-T7-1 | Secret key material MUST NOT appear in | | | receipts, checkpoints, manifests, | | | decision tokens, logs, or example output. | +-------------+-------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T7-2 | Example and test keys MUST be generated | | | at runtime or stored as clearly fake | | | fixtures, never as production secrets. | +-------------+-------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T7-3 | Production deployments SHOULD use an HSM | | | or OS key store and SHOULD rotate keys. | +-------------+-------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T7-4 | Implementations MAY encrypt keys at rest. | +-------------+-------------------------------------------+ Table 15 14.8. T8: Counterparty price gouging or defective delivery +=================+==============================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=================+==============================================+ | MUST-T8-1 | A Trade Manifest MUST bind goods or service | | | description, price, currency, acceptance- | | | criteria hash, cancel condition, and expiry. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-2 | A spend bound to a manifest MUST be denied | | | if the requested amount or currency differs | | | from the manifest. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-3 | If delivery bytes do not hash to the | | | acceptance-criteria hash, the implementation | | | MUST be able to produce a Dispute Evidence | | | Bundle containing the manifest, the spend | | | receipt, and the delivery hash. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-4 | The Dispute Evidence Bundle MUST NOT be | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 30] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | described as an arbitral award or escrow | | | release. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-7 | manifestHash MUST be the SHA-256 of the | | | signed Trade Manifest COSE bytes and MUST | | | NOT include the issuer public key encoding. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T8-5 | Manifests SHOULD reference an AP2 mandate | | | hash when one exists. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T8-6 | Parties MAY add an optional escrow actor as | | | a third-party role interface; this project | | | MUST NOT implement custody. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-custody | Implementations of this specification MUST | | | NOT take custody of funds or operate escrow. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T8-8 | If a payee countersignature is present, a | | | verifier MUST reject it when the signature | | | fails, when kid or content type does not | | | match the configured payee key, or when the | | | payload is not the issuer COSE_Sign1 bytes. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T8-9 | A payee MAY attach a detached COSE_Sign1 | | | countersignature over the issuer receipt | | | bytes. Absence MUST NOT invalidate the | | | issuer receipt. | +-----------------+----------------------------------------------+ Table 16 14.9. MUST-T8-custody Implementations of this specification MUST NOT take custody of funds or operate escrow. See also Section 14.13. 14.10. T9: PII leakage into the transparency log See also Section 13. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 31] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 +=============+===================================================+ | ID | Requirement | +=============+===================================================+ | MUST-T9-1 | A transparency encoding MUST support omitting or | | | hashing payer/payee identifiers and MUST support | | | amount redaction or range/bucket encoding. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T9-2 | Implementations MUST NOT write raw government-ID, | | | payment-instrument PAN, or street address fields | | | into a public transparency statement. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T9-3 | Default public anchors SHOULD publish policyHash, | | | manifestHash, receiptHash, and timestamp rather | | | than full claim sets. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T9-4 | A private auditor MAY receive an unredacted | | | receipt out of band. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T9-5 | A checkpoint discloses a per-currency window | | | total, which the receipt-field rules above do not | | | cover. Withholding it is governed by MUST-T11-12 | | | and MUST-T11-13: null in the signed payload, and | | | no other form of redaction honoured. | +-------------+---------------------------------------------------+ Table 17 14.11. T10: Secret spend via rail bypass See Section 9. +==============+===============================================+ | ID | Requirement | +==============+===============================================+ | MUST-T10-1 | A verifier MUST match each extract settlement | | | to a settled receipt on ref AND amount AND | | | currency. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-2 | A settlement with no matching receipt MUST be | | | reported as a completeness failure identified | | | by that settlement ref. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-3 | A settled Spend Receipt whose x402PaymentRef | | | is not on the extract MUST be reported as a | | | completeness failure. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-4 | An audit that has any fail-severity | | | completeness finding MUST fail (non-zero | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 32] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | status in the companion tool). | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T10-5 | Hosts SHOULD still apply T5 (no ungated rail | | | in the model process). Completeness does not | | | replace prevention. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-6 | A ref that appears more than once among | | | settled receipts or among extract rows MUST | | | be reported as duplicate-ref. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-7 | A verifier MUST obtain the extract from the | | | rail or from a rail signature. With no | | | pinned rail key, an unverifiable extract MUST | | | be reported as unauthenticated-extract and | | | makes the completeness guarantee conditional. | | | With a pinned key, see MUST-T10-8: the | | | extract MUST fail closed rather than warn. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-8 | A verifier MUST obtain the rail public key | | | out of band and MUST verify the extract | | | signature against that key, not against a key | | | the extract carries. Without such a key the | | | guarantee is conditional. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-9 | Keys MUST be compared by SubjectPublicKeyInfo | | | DER encoding rather than by any text | | | encoding. A pinned key that cannot be | | | decoded MUST be reported as trust-key- | | | unreadable, not as a key mismatch. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-10 | Every settlement record whose timestampMs | | | falls outside the extract's declared window | | | MUST be reported as extract-scope-mismatch, | | | identified by that record's ref. This check | | | MUST run whether or not a key is pinned. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-11 | When the verifier states an expected account, | | | rail, or window, an extract that does not | | | cover it MUST fail closed as extract-scope- | | | mismatch. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-12 | When an extract is supplied, the records it | | | carries are the subject of reconciliation. A | | | settlement list from another source MUST NOT | | | be substituted; a disagreeing list MUST be | | | reported as extract-settlement-mismatch. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-13 | A ref reported as duplicate-ref MUST still be | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 33] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | reconciled by aggregate amount per currency, | | | and a shortfall MUST state the unaccounted | | | amount. An unparseable amount MUST be | | | reported as malformed-amount without aborting | | | the audit. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-14 | An implementation MUST surface the guarantee | | | and any warnings in any human-readable audit | | | report it produces, not only in a returned | | | structure. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-15 | A verifier that has not stated the period | | | under audit MUST emit unstated-audit-window | | | and MUST treat the guarantee as conditional, | | | because an unstated period leaves the extract | | | free to define its own. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T10-16 | When an extract is supplied, only receipts | | | whose timestampMs falls in its declared | | | window are reconciled against it. A receipt | | | outside that window MUST NOT be reported as a | | | completeness failure against that extract. | +--------------+-----------------------------------------------+ Table 18 In MUST-T10-4, a completeness finding that makes the audit fail is distinct from a warning that only makes the guarantee conditional. The verification algorithm states that distinction by behaviour (Section 9). 14.12. T11: Checkpoint suppression or rollback +==============+=================================================+ | ID | Requirement | +==============+=================================================+ | MUST-T11-1 | An epoch checkpoint MUST be COSE-signed and | | | MUST bind epoch number, time window, receipt | | | count, chain-head hash, per-currency totals, | | | and the previous checkpoint hash. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-2 | Verifiers MUST reject a checkpoint whose | | | signature fails, whose totals do not match | | | settled receipts in the declared window, whose | | | receiptCount is wrong, or whose chainHeadHash | | | is not the last in-window receipt hash. Where | | | the signed totals are null, MUST-T11-12 governs | | | instead: there is no total to disagree with, | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 34] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | the comparison is reported as skipped, and the | | | count and chain-head checks still apply. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-3 | Two verified checkpoints for the same epoch | | | with different hashes MUST be reported as | | | equivocation. The checkpoints compared are | | | those presented together with those carried by | | | verified transparency receipts; the presented | | | chain alone cannot satisfy this requirement, | | | because MUST-T11-8 makes its epochs | | | consecutive. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-4 | A broken checkpoint hash chain MUST fail | | | verification. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | SHOULD-T11-5 | Checkpoints SHOULD be registered with a | | | Transparency Service when one is configured. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MAY-T11-6 | A test deployment MAY use an in-process append- | | | only log as the witness. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-7 | Checkpoint windows MUST be half-open [startMs, | | | endMs). Every chained receipt MUST fall in | | | exactly one window. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-8 | Presented checkpoint epochs MUST be consecutive | | | and adjacent windows MUST meet at endMs = | | | next.startMs. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-9 | Prefix-deletion and suppression claims that go | | | beyond the presented chain are conditional on | | | an external transparency witness. A report | | | MUST NOT present a completeness guarantee as | | | settling suppression when no witness was | | | consulted. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-10 | Transparency receipts are an optional, separate | | | input. A verifier given none MUST behave as it | | | did without this input. A receipt MUST have | | | its signature verified before it counts for | | | anything. Where a receipt also carries the | | | statement body, that body MUST NOT be relied on | | | unless its statement hash equals the one the | | | receipt binds and it verifies as a checkpoint; | | | a discarded body does not discard its receipt. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-11 | A verified receipt binding a checkpoint absent | | | from the presented chain MUST be reported as a | Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 35] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 | | withheld checkpoint, and MUST NOT be reported | | | as a window coverage failure. A presented | | | checkpoint with no verified receipt, where a | | | witness was supplied, MUST be reported and | | | makes the guarantee conditional. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-12 | Withheld checkpoint totals MUST be encoded as | | | null in the signed payload. A verifier MUST | | | report that the totals comparison was skipped | | | and MUST treat the guarantee as conditional; | | | receiptCount and chainHeadHash MUST still be | | | checked. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-13 | A redaction asserted outside the signed payload | | | MUST NOT be honoured, and structural claims | | | MUST NOT be redacted. A checkpoint that fails | | | verification MUST NOT be treated as redacted. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ | MUST-T11-14 | An epoch checkpoint MUST be registrable as a | | | Signed Statement carrying the checkpoint COSE | | | object with content type application/cedulon- | | | checkpoint+cbor. | +--------------+-------------------------------------------------+ Table 19 Issuer self-attestation: A Receipt Issuer that also produces the only copy of the extract can omit settlements. Completeness holds only against an extract the verifier obtained from the rail or from a rail signature. Key rotation and revocation: kid identifies the verification key. This -02 does not specify a revocation list. Verifiers MUST pin the issuer keys they accept and MUST stop accepting a kid after an authenticated revocation signal. Timestamp trust: timestampMs is issuer-asserted. Window assignment uses that field. A lying issuer can slide a receipt between windows. External timestamping of receipts is out of scope for -02; the checkpoint witness added here covers checkpoints, not receipt timestamps. Collusion: If the rail operator and the issuer collude, they can publish a matching extract and receipt set that hides a real-world settlement. Cedulon does not detect extract-external agreement. Reversal, refund, and partial settlement: State machines for Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 36] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 reversal, refund, and partial settlement are out of scope for this revision. 14.13. Optional escrow role Parties MAY name an escrow actor in a Trade Manifest as a third-party role that holds funds under rules outside this protocol (MAY-T8-6). Implementations of this specification MUST NOT take custody or operate escrow (MUST-T8-custody). 15. IANA Considerations CWT claim labels need no assignment: this profile uses private-use integer labels below -65536. Media types do. This document defines five and makes their values a normative check inside a protected COSE header (MUST-T4-8, MUST- T6-5), so they cannot stay unregistered while that check stands. If this work is taken up, the following should be registered in the Standards Tree per [RFC6838]: +======================================+============================+ | Media type | Carries | +======================================+============================+ | application/cedulon-receipt+cbor | Spend Receipt claim set | +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/cedulon-checkpoint+cbor | Epoch checkpoint claim set | +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/cedulon-manifest+cbor | Trade Manifest claim set | +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/cedulon-decision+cbor | Decision Token claim set | +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+ | application/cedulon- | Payee countersignature | | countersign+cbor | | +--------------------------------------+----------------------------+ Table 20 For each: encoding is binary CBOR [RFC8949]; security considerations are those in Section 14; the change controller would be the IETF; the contact is the author of this document. Until registration, an implementation outside a closed deployment should expect these names to change, and readers should treat them as placeholders rather than as stable identifiers. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 37] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 16. Implementation Status This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC. RFC 7942 [RFC7942] note. Implementation: A companion implementation with a runnable verification suite at https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/cedulon (https://github.com/dogrucanemek-alt/cedulon). The code is a profile of this document, not a second specification. This -02 is not an IETF working-group item. Maturity: Research code by a single implementer. Three readers have run the code on their own machines against a pinned commit and reported figures matching the author's: two from a clean clone of the whole suite, one re-running the published reproduction. That is byte-stability across environments, not an independent implementation, and the distinction matters: the same code agreeing with itself on three machines rules out a local accident and nothing more. One reader reports an independent implementation of the Signed Statement identity, kept deliberately separate from this codebase; no independent implementation of the reconciliation algorithm is known to the author. Coverage: The receipt, checkpoint, extract, reconciliation, and verification algorithm are implemented, including the transparency witness input, the withheld and not-anchored conditions, and signed totals redaction. Every requirement added in this revision is implemented and covered by a red-then-green case before appearing in this text. The witness used in the suite is the in- process append-only log that MAY-T11-6 permits; the implementation has not been run against a deployed Transparency Service, and it treats a receipt as a signature over a statement, not as a proof of log membership. The escrow role, reversal, refund, and partial settlement are not implemented. Licensing: Apache-2.0. Contact: The author of this document. Experience: Readers of -00 and -01 have reported defects in both, and each revision has been driven by what they found rather than by a plan. -01 fixed a bypass of the completeness claim and a gap about which key an extract is checked against. The defect behind this revision was reported against -01 by a reader who then had it independently confirmed by a second: the object carrying the T11 guarantee was not profiled for registration and was never read during verification. Repairing it turned up one more, found while Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 38] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 checking the repair rather than reported: the first attempt asserted the totals redaction in a field outside the signature, which let a checkpoint with wrong signed totals be re-presented as redacted and silence the mismatch. That is the defect MUST-T11-13 now forbids, and it was the same shape as the bypass -01 was written to fix. Note on distribution: the requirements in this document are implemented in the repository at the commit named in the release notes. The published @cedulon packages lag the repository: as of this revision the requirements added here are in the repository but not yet in a published package version, so a reader checking a claim against an installed package should read the repository instead, or confirm the package version carries the commit. 16.1. Changes from -01 This revision has one subject: the checkpoint, which carries the T11 guarantee against suppression and rollback, was not wired into anything that could discharge it. A reader of -01 set out the gap and a second reader confirmed it independently. Four things were wrong at once, and they were the same thing seen from four sides. The SCITT anchoring section profiled the Spend Receipt and not the checkpoint, so SHOULD-T11-5 asked for checkpoints to be registered without saying in what form (MUST-T11-14 now says). None of the steps of the verification algorithm read a transparency receipt, so a deployment could follow SHOULD-T11-5 to the letter and still have a verifier that never consulted the witness (steps 15 and 16 now do). MUST-T11-3, equivocation, could not fire at all: the only checkpoints compared were the presented ones, and MUST-T11-8 requires those to be consecutive, so no two of them can share an epoch. A second copy is found in a witness, and nothing brought one in. And the checkpoint binds a per-currency total for a window while the privacy section counted only receipt fields, so a window total could be published, or withheld, with no stated rule either way. The repairs are MUST-T11-10 through MUST-T11-14. The transparency receipt is a new optional input; supplying none leaves the verifier behaving exactly as in -01, which is deliberate, because the point of the witness is to add a claim that could not be made before, not to withdraw one that could. Two decisions inside those repairs are worth stating on their own, because a reader might reasonably have expected the other choice. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 39] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 * A recorded checkpoint the presented chain omits gets its own identifier, checkpoint-withheld, rather than being folded into window-coverage (MUST-T11-11). The reporter asked which way it should go. Coverage says the record shown is incomplete; a withheld checkpoint says the party under audit is holding a record it did not show. An operator who sees one identifier for both cannot tell an incomplete record from a concealed one, which is the distinction the whole threat is about. * A checkpoint with no receipt in a supplied witness is a warning rather than a failure. A witness may be configured after checkpoints have already been issued, and an operator's own gap in anchoring is not evidence that anything was concealed. The asymmetry is deliberate: what the witness holds and the chain does not is a finding, what the chain holds and the witness does not is a warning. One change is not a repair of -01 but of the first attempt at this revision, and it is recorded because the failure is instructive. Signed totals were first made redactable through a field carried alongside the checkpoint rather than inside the COSE payload. Anything outside the signature is chosen by whoever presents the object, which here is the party under audit, so a checkpoint whose signed totals disagreed with its receipts could be re-presented as redacted and the mismatch went unreported. Redaction is now inside the signature and a redaction asserted anywhere else MUST be ignored (MUST-T11-12, MUST-T11-13). This was the same shape as the bypass -01 was written to close: a check that a party under audit could switch off. Reversal, refund, partial settlement, and the escrow role remain out of scope and are still expected later, with no date. -01 said the same and this revision does not improve on it. The reporters are named in the Acknowledgments. 17. Evolution and Future Work (Informative) This section is a direction, not a commitment. The structures below are reserved in name only. Normative wire formats, tests, and threat-model MUST lines for them belong in later revisions (-03 or later), written with the same discipline as this -02. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 40] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 17.1. Re-attestation profile Algorithms retire. A Spend Receipt or checkpoint signed under Ed25519 today may need a later verifier that no longer accepts -19. A companion seed [REATTEST] sketches re-attestation: register the original COSE bytes as a SCITT Signed Statement and have a current algorithm countersign or receipt them. The principle is that structures outlive ciphers. The first concrete example is the profile's own move from generic EdDSA (-8) to Ed25519 (-19) in [RFC9864]. 17.2. Streaming reconciliation Epoch checkpoints in this document are batch windows. A later revision may define a continuous, second-scale profile [STREAMING] in which the same completeness relation is evaluated as settlements arrive, without waiting for an epoch close. That work does not change the matching rules in this document, and it did not arrive in this revision either. 17.3. Generalization Payment is the special case that this -02 implements. The same completeness calculus (an authenticated extract of consumed units reconciled to signed receipts) can apply to other consumable resources such as compute, data, or energy. This document does not specify those profiles. 18. Informative Notes on Adjacent Protocols x402 [X402] uses HTTP 402 [RFC9110] to negotiate stablecoin payment. AP2 [AP2] uses signed mandates as verifiable credentials. Cedulon does not replace either protocol. Profiles built on HTTP Message Signatures [RFC9421] authenticate bots; they are not a spend receipt. draft-bates-atp [BATES-ATP] is a lineage neighbor. It does not define rail-extract completeness. draft-vauban-x402-stark-receipts [VAUBAN] specifies complementary x402 receipt-format variants that a Cedulon Spend Receipt MAY carry as a rail proof; it does not define rail-extract completeness. draft- schrock-ep-outcome-binding [SCHROCK] compares authorized action bytes to independently observed effects; it does not define rail-extract completeness. draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts [MARQUES] profiles access-control action receipts (the broader Acta family includes [ACTA]); it does not define rail-extract completeness. draft-hopley-x402-compliance-receipt [HOPLEY] records an admission- time compliance decision; it does not define rail-extract completeness. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 41] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 19. References 19.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . [RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, . [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, May 2018, . [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, . [RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052, DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022, . [RFC9053] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE): Initial Algorithms", RFC 9053, DOI 10.17487/RFC9053, August 2022, . Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 42] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 [RFC9864] Jones, M.B. and O. Steele, "Fully-Specified Algorithms for JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", RFC 9864, DOI 10.17487/RFC9864, October 2025, . [RFC9942] Steele, O., Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., and C. Fournet, "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) Receipts", RFC 9942, DOI 10.17487/RFC9942, June 2026, . [RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande, Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943, DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026, . 19.2. Informative References [ACTA] Farley, T., "Signed Decision Receipts for Machine-to- Machine Access Control", June 2026, . [AP2] Google Agentic Commerce, "Agent Payments Protocol (AP2)", September 2025, . [BATES-ATP] Bates, D., "Agent Transaction Protocol (ATP)", May 2026, . [GRIGG] Grigg, I., "Triple Entry Accounting", 2005, . [HOPLEY] Hopley, C., "Categorical Compliance Screening Receipt Format for Agentic-Payment Flows", May 2026, . [MARQUES] Gomes Marques, J. A., "Compliance Profile of Signed Action Receipts for AI Agents", July 2026, . [PACIOLI] Pacioli, L., "Summa de arithmetica, geometria, proportioni et proportionalita", 1494. Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 43] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 [REATTEST] Dogru, E. C., "Cedulon Re-Attestation: Carrying Spend Evidence Across Algorithm Retirement", August 2026, . [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, . [RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110, DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022, . [RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421, February 2024, . [SCHROCK] Schrock, I., "Outcome Binding for Authorized Actions and Independently Observed Effects", July 2026, . [STREAMING] Dogru, E. C., "Cedulon Streaming Reconciliation: Continuous Completeness for Agent Spend", August 2026, . [VAUBAN] Vauban Research, "x402 STARK Receipt Format Extension", May 2026, . [X402] x402 Foundation, "x402: An Open Standard for Internet- Native Payments", 2026, . Acknowledgments Vernon Wharff set out the defect this revision repairs: that the object carrying the T11 guarantee was neither profiled for registration nor read during verification, and that the equivocation requirement could not fire against a presented chain. He also asked the question that decided the shape of the repair, namely whether a recorded checkpoint absent from the chain deserves its own identifier or belongs under window coverage. Iman Schrock confirmed the finding Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 44] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 independently and drew its boundary, keeping it separate from the extract-binding work already closed in -01. Iman Schrock and Pablo Play ran the -00 implementation against the pinned commit and reported the defects that produced -01. Iman Schrock found the two extract-binding defects, proposed the repair -01 adopts, later reran the posted -01 from a clean clone against its own pinned commit, and is also the author of [SCHROCK], cited here as adjacent work. He is the reader whose independent implementation of the Signed Statement identity is noted in Section 16, and he asked for it to be kept separate from any cross-implementation claim about Cedulon; that separation is his and is recorded here as he stated it. Pablo Play found that a repeated reference hid the unaccounted amount, filed a written reproduction, and re-ran that reproduction against the pinned commit to confirm the figures quoted from it. Nicholas Templeman ran the suite from a clean clone on a different operating system and reported his figures, and classified his own run honestly as a repetition of the author's checks rather than an independent implementation. Walter Hawkins did not run it; he read the reported figures and pressed for the run to be stated precisely enough to be repeatable, which is why the conditions and not only the totals appear in Section 16. None of them reviewed this text, and any error in it is the author's. Field survey notes and the informative threat-model narrative in the companion repository helped shape the requirement identifiers used here. Those identifiers are defined in Section 14. Appendix A. Test Vectors These vectors use RFC 8032 Ed25519 secret scalar #1 (fixture only; never a production key). Hex is lowercase. They MUST match the locked tests in the companion implementation. Receipt COSE_Sign1: Claims: payer=payer-1, payee=payee-1, amount=1, currency=USD, policyHash=aa, manifestHash=null, noManifest=true, x402PaymentRef=null, timestampMs=1700000000000, nonce=n100000000000000, prevReceiptHash=null, outcome=aborted. COSE_Sign1 hex (whitespace ignored; identical to the locked test): Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 45] Internet-Draft Cedulon August 2026 845830a301320378206170706c69636174696f6e2f636564756c6f6e2d 726563656970742b63626f72044806e3fd8fda29bb60a0587cac3a0001 11706770617965722d313a000111716770617965652d313a0001117261 313a00011173635553443a000111746261613a00011175f63a00011176 f53a00011177f63a000111781b0000018bcfe568003a00011179706e31 30303030303030303030303030303a0001117af63a0001117b6761626f 727465645840685c01aa778a850b9d35250406f092b6f5cb03fb359593 0422533e28ac620ad439f5e7bd8ed1fa5ded90d4421a2de34f94d1d78d 38a65812cb5315ee7f1cf403 Manifest COSE_Sign1: Body: description=fixture-goods, amount=1, currency=USD, acceptanceCriteriaHash=00, cancelCondition=none, expiresAtMs=1700000000000, ap2MandateHash=null. COSE_Sign1 hex (whitespace ignored; identical to the locked test): 845831a301320378216170706c69636174696f6e2f636564756c6f6e2d 6d616e69666573742b63626f72044806e3fd8fda29bb60a0584aa73a00 0112386d666978747572652d676f6f64733a0001123961313a0001123a 635553443a0001123b6230303a0001123c646e6f6e653a0001123d1b00 00018bcfe568003a0001123ef65840898628b1524a44ca641b5058c7a4 7e71bd4ce1ca0782e03b511c23e0819c3771407d627216d0b104224ee8 2cacffbd21e66fe035ed5ce4ee85b7bcd9c560ad02 Author's Address Emek Can Dogru VERAX TEKNOLOJI LIMITED SIRKETI Email: e.dogru@cedulon.com Dogru Expires 28 February 2027 [Page 46]